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The Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (CJPTA) codifies the substantive law of jurisdiction
in British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan. One of the questions that may be posed by the
future of the CJPTA is how the jurisdictional system that it enacts would function in relation to two
potential international conventions that are contemplated by the Hague Conference on Private
International Law. One, a convention on the enforcement of judgments, is in an advanced stage of
negotiation and may well be adopted by the Hague Conference. It deals with jurisdiction indirectly, by
defining jurisdictional standards or “filters” that must be satisfied for civil and commercial judgments to
be recognized under its rules. A remoter possibility, but expressly on the Conference’s agenda, is a further
convention dealing with jurisdiction directly, potentially including acceptable standards of jurisdiction and
dealing with issues of forum non conveniens (declining jurisdiction) and lis alibi pendens (parallel
proceedings pursued concurrently in a foreign court). This article compares the CJPTA’s jurisdictional
rules with those included as “filters” in the latest draft of the judgments convention in November 2017,
and with those that might form part of a further convention to harmonize jurisdictional rules directly. It
concludes that the CJPTA could operate without difficulty in relation to the proposed judgments
convention and, very probably, an eventual jurisdiction convention, because its jurisdictional standards
are, almost without exception, more liberal than those incorporated in the Hague models. The article also
suggests that there is no reason to modify the CJPTA so as to bring it closer to the rules being developed
in The Hague, since the CJPTA regulates jurisdiction, not just in international, but also in interprovincial
cases, where different standards are appropriate.
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(CJPTA)
codifies the substantive law of jurisdiction in British Columbia, Nova Scotia,
and Saskatchewan. One of the questions that may be posed by the future of
the CJPTA is how the jurisdictional system that it enacts would function in
relation to two potential international conventions that are contemplated by
the Hague Conference on Private International Law. One, a convention on
the enforcement of judgments, is in an advanced stage of negotiation and may
well be adopted by the Hague Conference. It deals with jurisdiction indirectly,
by defining jurisdictional standards or “filters” that must be satisfied for civil and
commercial judgments to be recognized under its rules. A remoter possibility,
but expressly on the Conference’s agenda, is a further convention dealing with
jurisdiction directly, potentially including acceptable standards of jurisdiction
and dealing with issues of forum non conveniens (declining jurisdiction) and lis
alibi pendens (parallel proceedings pursued concurrently in a foreign court). This
article compares the CJPTA’s jurisdictional rules with those included as “filters”
in the latest draft of the judgments convention in November 2017, and with
those that might form part of a further convention to harmonize jurisdictional
rules directly. It concludes that the CJPTA could operate without difficulty in
relation to the proposed judgments convention and, very probably, an eventual
jurisdiction convention, because its jurisdictional standards are, almost without
exception, more liberal than those incorporated in the Hague models. The
article also suggests that there is no reason to modify the CJPTA so as to bring
it closer to the rules being developed in The Hague, since the CJPTA regulates
jurisdiction, not just in international, but also in interprovincial cases, where
different standards are appropriate.
THE COURT JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS TRANSFER ACT
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I. JURISDICTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The codification of the substantive law of jurisdiction in the Court Jurisdiction and
Proceedings Transfer Act (CJPTA)1 must be viewed not only from the perspective
of Canadian private international law but also from that of international efforts to
coordinate the law of jurisdiction and foreign judgments. Most prominent among
the latter are the projects of the Hague Conference on Private International Law
(“Hague Conference”). These include a failed attempt at a convention to deal
both with jurisdiction and with foreign judgments (1999–2001); a promulgated
convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2005); a new attempt, currently
under way, to develop a convention on recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments without any direct rules on jurisdiction—instead, using jurisdictional
“filters” (judgments convention); and a foreshadowed attempt to develop a
separate convention with direct rules on jurisdiction.
This article compares the CJPTA’s jurisdictional rules with those included
as “filters” in the latest draft of the judgments convention in November 2017,
and with those that might form part of a further convention to harmonize
jurisdictional rules directly. It concludes that the CJPTA could operate without
difficulty in relation to the proposed judgments convention and, very probably,
an eventual jurisdiction convention, because its jurisdictional standards are,
almost without exception, more liberal than those incorporated in the Hague
models. The article also suggests that there is no reason to modify the CJPTA so
as to bring it closer to the rules being developed in the draft Hague convention.
To set the context, a brief history of the Hague Conference projects is
necessary. The earliest attempt to develop a comprehensive convention on the
1.

The Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act promulgated by the Uniform
Law Conference in 1994 has been enacted in three provinces—British Columbia, Nova
Scotia, and Saskatchewan. See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the
Seventy-Sixth Annual Meeting, 1994, Appendix C: Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer
Act, online: <www.ulcc.ca/images/stories/1994_EN_pdf/1994ulcc0008_Court_Jurisdiction_
Proceedings_Transfer_Act.pdf> at 140; Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SBC
2003, c 28 (entered into force 4 May 2006) [CJPTA (BC)]; Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings
Transfer Act, SNS 2003 (2d Sess), c 2 (entered into force 1 June 2008); The Court Jurisdiction
and Proceedings Transfer Act, SS 1997, c C-41.1 (entered into force 1 March 2004) [CJPTA
(SK)]. The acts differ slightly. Yukon Territory has enacted it but has not yet brought it into
force. See Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SY 2000, c 7. See also Vaughan
Black, Stephen GA Pitel & Michael Sobkin, Statutory Jurisdiction: An Analysis of the Court
Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (Toronto: Carswell, 2012). All general section
references to the CJPTA in this article refer to the section numbering in the BC enactment
unless otherwise specified.
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recognition and enforcement of civil judgments began with a decision of the
Conference in 1960,2 and culminated in the Convention of 1 February 1971 on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters.3 This convention attracted no adherents, partly because of its complexity
and partly because the European countries had developed the Brussels Convention,4
which successfully covered the field within the European Communities.
In May 1992, the United States proposed to the Hague Conference that it
initiate a new project on the recognition and enforcement of civil judgments,
contrasting the success of the 1958 New York Convention on the enforcement of
arbitral awards with the absence of any international agreement on enforcing civil
judgments.5 The Hague Conference took up this proposal. From the outset, there
were shifting and conflicting views on whether the convention should include
rules, not only on foreign judgments, but also on the grounds on which courts
in states that were parties to the convention must or must not take jurisdiction.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Catherine Kessedjian, “International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters” (The Hague: Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, April 1997) at para 3, online: <assets.hcch.net/docs/76852ce3-a967-42e494f5-24be4289d1e5.pdf>.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 1 February 1971, Hague Conference on Private International Law (entered
into force 20 August 1979), online: <www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/
full-text/?cid=78> [Hague Convention].
Kessedjian, supra note 2 at para 7. According to the Report, citing the Permanent Bureau’s
Preliminary Document No 17 of May 1992, the Brussels Convention built to a large extent on
the Hague Convention and was negotiated in part by the same persons. See EC, 1968 Brussels
Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters,
[1972] OJ, L 299/32 [Brussels Convention]. The Lugano Convention extended the Brussels
regime to the European Free Trade Area (“EFTA”). See EC, Convention on jurisdiction and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2009] OJ,
L 147/5 [Lugano Convention].
Letter from the Legal Advisor to the Secretary of State to the Secretary General of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law (5 May 1992), online: State Department of the
United States <www.state.gov/documents/organization/65973.pdf> [Letter from the Legal
Advisor]. The approach to the Hague Conference came after informal discussions that Arthur
von Mehren had in 1991 with representatives of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
to explore possibly negotiating a foreign judgments treaty between the United States and
the EC-EFTA member states. The consensus was that working on a Hague convention
was a more promising avenue. See Arthur T von Mehren, “Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague Conference?” (1994) 57:3 Law &
Contemp Probs 271 at 281-82 [von Mehren, “Recognition and Enforcement”].
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The United States’ initial proposal dealt with this issue.6 It suggested that the
Brussels Convention model was a valuable one, but a closed list of acceptable bases
for jurisdiction might not attract broad enough support outside Western Europe.
Rather than having to choose between a traité simple, dealing with recognition
and enforcement of judgments only, and a traité double, mandating as well the
jurisdictional grounds that states must follow, the proposal suggested that the
Hague Conference should consider the third option of a traité mixte. This third
option could mandate some jurisdictional grounds (a “white list”), exclude
others as exorbitant grounds (a “black list”), and leave states free to use or not use
jurisdictional grounds that were not on either list (a “grey zone”).7
The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference first took the view that efforts
should be directed at a traité simple, because any attempt to codify jurisdictional
grounds would run up against the problem that parties to the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions would be very reluctant to subscribe to any jurisdictional regime that
departed significantly from the European one.8 Things moved along, and in 1996
the Hague Conference definitively decided to look at “the question of jurisdiction,
and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial
matters.”9 A year later, the Permanent Bureau had swung around to insisting that
“the issue is much more one of direct jurisdiction than of the recognition and
enforcement of judgments.”10 From then on the Hague Conference’s efforts were
directed at producing at least a traité mixte rather than just a traité simple.
In 1999, a Special Commission developed a preliminary draft convention
(“1999 Hague draft”), which was the subject of an explanatory report by Peter
6.
7.

Letter from the Legal Advisor, supra note 5.
The mixed convention option was favoured by von Mehren. See von Mehren, “Recognition
and Enforcement,” supra note 5 at 287. He continued to believe in it even when negotiations
on it were going badly. See Arthur T von Mehren, “Drafting a Convention on International
Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-wide: Can the Hague
Conference Project Succeed?” (2001) 49:2 Am J Comp L 191 [von Mehren, “Drafting a
Convention”]. On the typology of judgment conventions, suggesting that there are actually
nine types, see Ralf Michaels, “Some Fundamental Jurisdictional Conceptions as Applied
to Judgment Conventions” in Eckart Gottschalk et al, eds, Conflict of Laws in a Globalized
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 29 at 45.
8. “Some Reflections of the Permanent Bureau on a general convention on enforcement of
judgments” in Proceedings of the Seventeenth Session, vol 1 (The Hague: Hague Conference
on Private International Law, 1992) at 231, paras 16-19, online: <assets.hcch.net/docs/
bd6dcaab-b2a4-4255-84 ec-eca3b7233588.pdf>.
9. “Final Act of the Eighteenth Session” in Proceedings of the Eighteenth Session (The Hague:
Hague Conference on Private International Law, 1996) at 47, online: <assets.hcch.net/
docs/63159a78-60af-43a4-be35-1f58a22645c1.pdf>.
10. Kessedjian, supra note 2 at para 8 [citations omitted].
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Nygh and Fausto Pocar.11 At the 2001 Diplomatic Conference of the Hague
Conference, a reworking of the draft (“2001 Hague draft”)12 showed all too
clearly the tensions between enthusiasts for the Brussels model and other
countries, especially the United States, with very different, generally broader,
jurisdictional grounds.13 Brackets, alternative versions, and variant versions had
proliferated like weeds.
Efforts to move things forward were unsuccessful. In 2003, the Hague
Conference narrowed the focus of the project to one relatively uncontroversial
jurisdictional principle, which was consent to jurisdiction by agreement. This
resulted in the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements

11. Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel Doc No 11 (2000),
online: <assets.hcch.net/docs/638883f3-0c0a-46c6-b646-7a099d9bd95e.pdf> [1999
Hague draft] (The 1999 Hague draft was adopted by a Special Commission in 1999).
This will occasionally be referred to as the “1999 mixed convention draft.” See also
Peter Nygh & Fausto Pocar, “Report of the Special Commission,” Hague Conference
on Private International Law, Prel Doc No 11 (2000) at 19, online: <assets.hcch.net/
docs/638883f3-0c0a-46c6-b646-7a099d9bd95e.pdf>. The aforementioned draft text and
report are both in Preliminary Document Number 11. For a Canadian view at the time,
see Vaughan Black, “Commodifying Justice for Global Free Trade: The Proposed Hague
Judgments Convention” (2000) 38:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 237.
12. Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic
Conference 6 -20 June 2001: Interim Text, Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Commission II, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
19th Sess (2001), online: <assets.hcch.net/docs/e172ab52-e2de-4e40-9051-11aee7c7be67.
pdf> [2001 Hague draft]. This will occasionally be referred to as the “2001 mixed
convention draft.”
13. Although not always broader. Brussels grounds of jurisdiction, especially assumed
jurisdiction in relation to contracts and torts, extend to some cases in which US law would
have due process concerns. See Ronald A Brand, “Due Process, Jurisdiction and a Hague
Judgments Convention” (1999) 60:3 U Pitt L Rev 661 [Brand, “Due Process”]. On the
impasse, see generally John J Barceló III & Kevin M Clermont, eds, A Global Law of
Jurisdiction and Judgments: Lessons from The Hague (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002); Gralf-Peter
Calliess, “Value-added Norms, Local Litigation, and Global Enforcement: Why the
Brussels-Philosophy failed in The Hague” (2004) 5:12 German LJ 1489; William E O’Brian
Jr, “The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments: The Way Forward” (2003) 66:4
Mod L Rev 491; Justyna Regan, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments – A
Second Attempt in The Hague?” (2015) 14:1 Rich J Global L & Bus 63 at 64-71. Arthur
von Mehren, writing in the midst of the impasse, attributed it in significant measure to “a
fundamental discordance between the views of the United States and of most, perhaps all,
European Union States respecting the role of adjudication in contemporary society.” See von
Mehren, “Drafting a Convention,” supra note 7 at 195.
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(“Choice of Court Convention”).14 The Choice of Court Convention is in force: the
European Union, Mexico, and Singapore have become parties to it.15 Because
defining jurisdiction was not the main issue,16 the convention’s importance lies
more in the provisions setting out the conditions of, and defences to, recognition
and enforcement of a judgment of the chosen court. Many of those provisions
have been carried over, mutatis mutandis, into the current project on a general
convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters.
The current project dates from 2011, when, at the instigation of the
Permanent Bureau, the Hague Conference appointed an Experts’ Group to
consider further work on a judgments project. That group recommended that
work be undertaken on a recognition and enforcement convention, including
jurisdictional filters. This recommendation led to a Working Group, which in

14. Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, 30 June 2005, Hague
Conference on Private International Law (entered into force 1 October 2015), online:
<www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/specialised-sections/choice-of-court> [Choice of
Court Convention].
15. Hague Conference on Private International Law, “Status Table: Convention of 30 June 2005
on Choice of Court Agreements” (last updated 5 October 2017), online: <www.hcch.net/
en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98>. As at the time of writing this article, the
United States and Ukraine had signed but not yet ratified.
16. Although some Canadian common law jurisdictional rules would change if Canada
becomes a party. Most notably, “strong cause” would no longer be a ground for taking
jurisdiction despite a forum selection clause choosing another judicial forum. Article
6 of the Choice of Court Convention limits the ability to take jurisdiction in the face of
an exclusive contractual choice of another court. If the choice of court agreement is
contractually valid, taking jurisdiction is only possible if giving effect to the agreement
would “lead to a manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to public policy” of
the forum, or the agreement cannot be reasonably performed, or the chosen court will not
hear the case. See Choice of Court Convention, supra note 14, art 6(c)-(e), respectively. See
also Vaughan Black, “Hague Convention Choice of Court Agreement and the Common
Law” (Paper delivered at the Annual Proceedings of the Uniform Law Conference of
Canada, Charlottetown, September 2007) at paras 29-31, online: <www.ulcc.ca/en/
annual-meetings/216-2007-charlottetown-pe/civil-section-documents/566-hagueconvention-choice-of-court-agreement-and-the-common-law-2007>. See also H Scott Fairley
& John Archibald, “After the Hague: Some Thoughts on the Impact on Canadian Law of the
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements” (2006) 12:2 ILSA J Intl & Comp L 417.
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2015 produced a proposed draft text of a convention (“Working Group draft”).17
The Working Group draft went to a Special Commission that met in June 2016
and revised it. The result was published as the Special Commission’s “2016
Preliminary Draft Convention.”18 The Special Commission met again twice
and revised the 2016 draft into the February 2017 Draft Convention which
most recently led to the November 2017 Draft Convention (“November 2017
Hague draft”),19 which is the latest indication of what a convention might look
like. Confidence seems high that a final version can be achieved. The Special
Commission has said it will propose to the Council of the Hague Conference
that the Special Commission have a fourth meeting in mid-2018 and that a
Diplomatic Session be convened in mid-2019.20
So, the prospects seem good that a traité simple form of convention will
emerge with “jurisdictional filters” but no direct rules on taking jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, despite the fiasco of 1999–2001, the ambition to create a jurisdiction
convention lives on. The Council of the Hague Conference resolved in March
2016, that, once the Special Commission has drawn up a draft recognition and
enforcement convention, the Experts’ Group would be convened again, this time
to consider “matters relating to direct jurisdiction (including exorbitant grounds

17. Proposed Draft Text on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Working Group on the Judgments Project, Prel
Doc No 1 (2016), online: <assets.hcch.net/docs/01adb7d9-13f3-4199-b1d3-ca62de79360f.
pdf> [Working Group draft]. For an explanatory note accompanying the Working Group
draft, see Explanatory Note Providing Background on the Proposed Draft Text and Identifying
Outstanding Issues, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel Doc No 2 (2016),
online: <assets.hcch.net/docs/e402cc72-19ed-4095-b004-ac47742dbc41.pdf> [April 2016
Explanatory Note].
18. 2016 Preliminary Draft Convention, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Special
Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, online: <assets.
hcch.net/docs/42a96b27-11fa-49f9-8e48-a82245aff1a6.pdf> [2016 Hague draft].
19. February 2017 Draft Convention, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Special
Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, online: <assets.
hcch.net/docs/d6f58225-0427-4a65-8f8b-180e79cafdbb.pdf> [February 2017 Hague draft];
November 2017 Draft Convention, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Special
Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, online: <assets.
hcch.net/docs/2f0e08f1-c498-4d15-9dd4-b902ec3902fc.pdf> [November 2017 Hague
draft]. A major portion of the November 2017 Hague draft is included as an appendix
to this article.
20. Hague Conference on Private International Law, “The Judgments Project: Special
Commission on the Judgments Project,” online: <https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/
legislative-projects/judgments>.
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and lis pendens/declining jurisdiction)” with a view to “preparing an additional
instrument.”21 The Council reiterated this plan in March 2017.22
Whether anything comes of such further consideration is highly uncertain.
If a convention along the lines of the November 2017 Hague draft does
materialize and is reasonably widely adopted, it is far from clear how much value
a convention on “direct jurisdiction” would add to the international litigation
system.23 If a judgments convention does not materialize or—probably the
greater risk—is not widely taken up, it is hard to see a jurisdiction convention,
which we know from experience is a much greater challenge, being viable at all.

II. THE CJPTA AND THE HAGUE PROJECTS
The main question about the CJPTA and the Hague projects is whether the
CJPTA’s rules might cause difficulty in the event that Canada becomes a party
to the judgments convention currently being negotiated. This convention is
already taking fairly clear shape, and, as noted, the chances that the negotiations
will succeed seem good. If they do, and if the convention is adopted by Canada

21. Conclusions and Recommendations Adopted by the Council, Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference (15-17 March
2016) at para 13, online: <assets.hcch.net/docs/679bd42c-f974-461a-8e1a-31e1b51eda10.
pdf>. The Council “confirmed that this is a priority project.” See ibid at para 14.
22. Conclusions and Recommendations Adopted by the Council, Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference (14-16 March
2017) at para 7, online: <assets.hcch.net/docs/77326cfb-ff7e-401a-b0e8-2de9efa1c7f6.pdf >.
23. If litigants know what jurisdictional grounds entitle an eventual judgment to be recognized
or enforced in another country, and having the judgment recognized or enforced matters
to them, their choice of where to litigate is accordingly circumscribed. There might still be
jurisdictional contests and manoeuvring because there could be more than one forum that
complies with the recognition rules (e.g., to take two from the November 2017 Hague draft:
the defendant’s habitual residence and the place where the defendant’s tortious conduct took
place. See November 2017 Hague Draft, supra note 19 at arts 5(1)(a), (g)). Here, a separate
jurisdiction convention might help by, for instance, providing a lis pendens rule. Where
parties do not care about whether an eventual judgment will be enforceable, the range of
possible jurisdictional struggles is larger, and a jurisdiction convention in principle would
help by reining in broad jurisdictional rules and providing an agreed upon set of rules to deal
with multiple forums and parallel proceedings. The benefits from doing all that, however,
are much harder to evaluate than the benefits from an agreed set of rules for recognizing and
enforcing judgments. One reason is that it is hard to assess how successfully, on the whole,
the problem of competing jurisdictions is already addressed through the current decentralized
international system, in which each country controls the ability of its own courts to take or
decline jurisdiction if there are other available forums.
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(probably province by province)24 and by a number of Canada’s trading partners,
the relationship between the CJPTA regime and the jurisdictional criteria in the
convention will become a matter of great practical importance.
A separate Hague jurisdiction convention is a remoter prospect. Such a
convention may one day see the light of day, but the jurisdictional principles in
the 1999 and 2001 drafts elicited little consensus at the time, and it is doubtful
whether they would garner any more now. If a new jurisdiction convention
eventually emerges, it is almost certainly going to look very different from these
drafts. Nevertheless, I have referred occasionally in this article to the contents of
the 1999 and 2001 Hague drafts as glimpses of what might possibly be included
in such a convention.
The jurisdictional grounds approved in the November 2017 Hague draft
are a relatively short list, which is not surprising, given that the participants in
the Special Commission, from a wide range of countries, had to agree on all of
them. A judgment from a court that had jurisdiction on one of these grounds
would have to be recognized or enforced. The convention’s regime would not
be exclusive; a state would be free to have its courts recognize judgments on
jurisdictional grounds accepted in its national recognition and enforcement rules
even if those judgments did not qualify under the convention.25 The convention
would apply only if both the state of origin and the requested state were parties
to the convention.26

III. SUBJECT MATTER ISSUES
Before looking in detail at how the CJPTA compares with the jurisdictional
provisions in the November 2017 Hague draft, it is worth noting some aspects of
the Hague regime relating to subject matter.
The CJPTA has no provisions that exclude any subject matter from its scope,
but some subject matters are indirectly excluded because court jurisdiction in
relation to them is dealt with in another statute, whether provincial or federal.27
The scope of the November 2017 Hague draft, as with the Hague project from

24. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 27. The now familiar “federal state clause”
enables a state to declare that the convention extends to all its territorial units or only to
some of them. The declaration to limit application to certain units must be made when the
state becomes a party but may be modified subsequently.
25. Ibid, art 16.
26. Ibid, art 1(2).
27. CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 12.
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the beginning, is limited to “civil or commercial matters.”28 Revenue matters are
expressly excluded as not being civil or commercial.29 A fairly long list of subject
matters that are definitely or arguably civil or commercial is also excluded. The
details are not material for the present purpose. Among others, they embrace the
status and capacity of natural persons, family law matters, succession, insolvency,
carriage of passengers and goods, and the validity, nullity, or dissolution of
corporations and other entities. 30 A notable exclusion is defamation,31 because it
involves freedom of expression and may have constitutional implications.32
The November 2017 Hague draft also makes some matters subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of one state. These, by and large, correspond to matters
that Canadian common law rules also regard as within one country’s exclusive
jurisdiction. The Moçambique rule33 is present, though in a narrower form. Only
courts in the country where immovable property is situated can rule directly on
rights in rem in the immovable,34 but that rule does not extend to personal claims
relating to such property.35
An area where the Special Commission has still not reached consensus
is how to deal with judgments on intellectual property (“IP”) rights. The
November 2017 Hague draft, unlike the 2016 Preliminary Draft Convention,
has a bracketed provision that would exclude judgments on IP rights from the
scope of the convention altogether.36 There is a further bracketed provision that
would exclude the enforcement of non-monetary remedies related to judgments
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

33.

34.

35.
36.

November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 1(1).
Ibid.
See ibid, art 2(1).
Ibid, art 2(1)(k). The same provision has a bracketed extension to judgments on privacy. See
ibid, art 2(1)(l).
See April 2016 Explanatory Note, supra note 17 at para 38. Although it is not referred to
in so many words, including defamation would have run head-on into the United States’
2010 SPEECH Act. See Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional
Heritage Act, 28 USC § 4102 (2010).
The rule, originating in British South Africa Co v Companhia de Moçambique, [1893] AC
602, [1891-94] All ER Rep 640 (HL), is that a court cannot adjudicate any claim, including
an in personam claim like trespass, that might involve adjudicating on the plaintiff’s title to
foreign immovable property.
November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 6(b). Article 6(c) adds a special rule about
judgments ruling on a tenancy of immovable property for a period of more than six months.
The court of the situs has exclusive jurisdiction under the convention only if the situs is in a
contracting state and the law of that state gives its own courts exclusive jurisdiction.
April 2016 Explanatory Note, supra note 17 at para 156.
November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 2(l)(m). There is a bracketed extension of
the exclusion to “analogous matters.”
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rendered in IP matters ruling on an infringement—even if such judgments were
within the convention.37
Alternative provisions set out the jurisdictional tests that will apply to IP
judgments if they are included in the convention’s scope. The drafters had to
grapple with the issue of territoriality. It has long been the general view that
jurisdiction in an infringement action, or some other action in which the validity
of the IP right is in issue, is strictly territorial, in the sense that only the state
whose IP right is in question can adjudicate the validity or infringement of the
right. The current of opinion has moved away from this position in relation to
copyright and other rights that do not depend on registration because there is
no impingement, even arguably, on the state’s sovereignty by a foreign court’s
deciding on such rights.38 Because a foreign decision on a registered right arguably
does involve the sovereignty of the state of registration, the territoriality principle
remains more solidly in place—although not unchallengeable—for rights like
patents and trademarks, which mostly do depend on registration.39
The November 2017 Hague draft removes judgments that rule on an IP right
or an analogous right from the general jurisdictional provisions altogether,40 and
restricts their recognition to three jurisdictional grounds, each of which apply to
a particular type of judgment. If the judgment rules on an infringement of an
IP right required to be granted or registered, it is recognized if the infringement
took place in the state of origin and the judgment is given by a court in the
state where the grant or registration of the right has taken place. There is a
bracketed exception for cases where, although the infringement took place in
the state of origin, the defendant had not acted there “to initiate or further the
37. Ibid, art 11. The provision would also confine the monetary remedy to an award “in relation
to harm suffered in the State of origin.”
38. Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39, [2012] 1 AC 208. The issue has not yet come
up in a Canadian case, but see Geophysical Service Inc v Jebco Seismic UK Ltd, 2016 ABQB
402 at para 24, 268 ACWS (3d) 765 [Jebco]. In Jebco, the court states: “It is difficult to
contemplate how a forum outside of Canada would ever be an appropriate forum for the
consideration and application of Canadian copyright law.”
39. The distinction between the territorial implications of the two types of IP rights is why article
2(1)(l) of the February 2017 Hague draft contemplated that the convention might include
judgments on copyright and other non-registered rights even if it otherwise excluded IP
rights from its scope. See February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 2(l)(i). This possible
excision from the (bracketed) general exclusion of IP judgments has been dropped in the
November 2017 Hague draft. See November 2017 Hague Draft, supra note 19, art 2(1)
(m). If IP judgments are ultimately not excluded, the distinction between registered and
non-registered IP rights would play out in the (currently bracketed) set of jurisdictional tests
for IP judgments. See November 2017 Hague Draft, supra note 19, art 5(3).
40. Compare the February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(k)-(m).
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infringement,” or the “activity cannot reasonably be seen as having been targeted
at that state.”41 The bracketed provision would seem aimed at concerns that the
place of infringement alone would not necessarily meet United States due process
standards.42 The other two jurisdictional grounds deal with judgments ruling on
the infringement or the validity of a copyright or related right, an unregistered
trademark, or unregistered industrial design. In the case of a judgment that rules
on an infringement, the infringement must have taken place in the state of origin
and the judgment must be given by a “court in the State for which protection
was claimed” (i.e., it must be that state’s copyright or other right that was in
question).43 In the case of a judgment that rules on validity, it must be the validity
of the right in the state of origin that is in issue, and the judgment must be “given
by a court in the State for which protection was claimed.”44 It is noteworthy
that this draft applies the territorial principle even to judgments relating to
copyright and other unregistered rights.45 This is done by means of a combined
territorial jurisdiction and applicable law test. The state of origin must be both
the jurisdiction where the infringement took place or where the validity of the
right was in issue (territorial jurisdiction), and the state for which protection was
claimed (applicable law).
In the case of granted or registered IP rights, the obligation to recognize and
enforce a judgment of a court of the state in which the grant or registration took
place, if the judgment rules on infringement of the right in that state, is reinforced

41. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(3)(a).
42. See Part IV(D)(3) below. The February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(k),
had the same proviso but its jurisdictional test was wider. It used only the place of grant
or registration of the right as the jurisdictional criterion, without stipulating that the
infringement must also have taken place in that state.
43. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(3)(b). This includes the same bracketed
proviso as article 5(3)(a), excluding cases in which the defendant has not acted in the state of
origin to further the infringement and did not target its activity at that state.
44. Ibid, art 5(3)(c). There is a bracketed extension of the category of judgments to not just
validity, but also subsistence or ownership of the right.
45. The February 2017 Hague draft left open the possibility that a judgment ruling on copyright
or another unregistered IP right could be recognized or enforced under one of the general
jurisdictional criteria—like the defendant’s habitual residence—even if the infringement took
place outside the state of origin or the law the court applied was that of a state other than
the state of origin. See February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5. By contrast, the
November 2017 Hague draft stipulates in the opening words of article 5(3) that the general
jurisdictional criteria in article 5(1) do not apply to a judgment that ruled on an IP right or
an analogous right. Only the criteria in article 5(3) apply. See November 2017 Hague draft,
supra note 19, arts 5(1), 5(3).
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by an obligation not to recognize or enforce any other state’s judgment that rules
on the validity of such an IP right.46

IV. TERRITORIAL COMPETENCE
A. GENERAL

In this part of the article, I will review the various heads of territorial competence
under the CJPTA from the point of view of how far they correspond to the
jurisdictional criteria that feature in the November 2017 Hague draft. As already
mentioned, I will also make occasional comparisons to the “direct jurisdiction”
provisions in the 1999 and 2001 Hague drafts.
A point that needs to be made at the outset is that the rules by which a
court determines its own jurisdiction, which is what the CJPTA deals with,
logically can differ from the rules that determine the jurisdiction of a foreign
court for the purpose of recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments, which
is what the Hague judgments convention would deal with. The law may allow
domestic courts to take jurisdiction on a ground that would not be recognized
as giving a foreign court jurisdiction (the reverse would not normally be true).
This is especially so if the domestic jurisdictional system gives a court discretion
to decline jurisdiction on forum non conveniens or other grounds. If the exercise
of jurisdiction is tempered by such a discretion, the grounds for jurisdiction can
be more broadly drawn. But in the case of foreign judgments, where there is

46. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 6(a). A bracketed insertion would broaden
the wording to “registration or validity” of the right. The obligation to refuse recognition or
enforcement would have effect if a judgment from a jurisdiction that is not the state of grant
or registration would otherwise qualify for recognition or enforcement under the recognizing
state’s national law. If recognized, such a judgment would not have in rem effects on the
validity of the registration but could have in personam effects as between the parties. The
convention does not in general restrict a contracting state’s right to apply broader foreign
judgment rules than those of the convention. See ibid, art 16. There is also a bracketed article
7(1)(g) that would give states the right—but does not impose an obligation—to refuse to
recognize or enforce a judgment that rules on the infringement of any IP right, including
a non-registered one, if the judgment applies a law to the right or the infringement (the
wording is still unsettled) other than that of the state of origin. See ibid, art 7(1)(g).
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typically no discretion to decline to recognize or enforce, it may be appropriate to
frame the grounds for the foreign court’s jurisdiction more narrowly.47
With very few exceptions, the CJPTA grounds for territorial competence
are broader than the corresponding jurisdictional grounds in the Hague drafts.
The CJPTA generally tracks the Canadian common law as it stood in the early
1990s, when the Uniform Law Conference of Canada prepared the uniform
CJPTA. The common law on jurisdiction has since evolved in two ways.
First, in assumed jurisdiction (meaning in personam jurisdiction as against a
defendant who is not present in the province),48 the Supreme Court of Canada
in Club Resorts49 adopted the analytical device of presumptive connecting factors
(“PCFs”). Second, in presence-based jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Canada,
in Chevron,50 clarified that the evolution of the Canadian common law in the
last 25 years has left untouched the common law rule that mere presence is
enough to found jurisdiction. From this it follows that an individual’s presence
in the province need not meet any test of substantiality. It also follows that,
as was specifically held in Chevron, a corporation’s constructive presence, through
carrying on business in the province, is fully equivalent to the physical presence
of an individual. It supports jurisdiction in any claim against the corporation,
regardless of whether the claim has anything to do with the defendant’s activities
in the province.
These developments have, if anything, opened up something of a gap
between the common law and the CJPTA, leaving the CJPTA sitting closer to the
Hague standards than the Canadian common law now does. In cases of assumed
jurisdiction, common law PCFs are now in some respects much wider than

47. In theory, Canadian law since 1990 has treated the scope of domestic jurisdiction and the
scope of a foreign court’s jurisdiction as correlatives by applying the “real and substantial
connection” criterion to both. See Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye, [1990] 3 SCR
1077 at 1094, 76 DLR (4th) 256; Beals v Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72 at paras 37-38, 84, 202,
[2003] 3 SCR 416 [Beals]. The principle of correlativity applies in a system constructed like
that of the European Brussels I Regulation (recast). See EC, Regulation No 1215/2012 of the
European Parliament of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), [2012] OJ, L351/1.
It is not axiomatic in relation to a common law system, and the difficulties posed by it have
never been fully examined by Canadian courts.
48. The distinction between assumed and presence-based jurisdiction was stressed in Chevron
Corp v Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42 at para 81, [2015] 3 SCR 69 [Chevron].
49. Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 at paras 78-79, [2012] 1 SCR 572 [Club Resorts].
50. Chevron, supra note 48.
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the presumed real and substantial connections listed in the CJPTA.51 True, the
expansive tendency of the common law may filter into the CJPTA via the use of
the “residual” real and substantial connection. However, the residual connection
is an avenue that courts in the CJPTA provinces have not been inclined to
open up much until now, and they will not necessarily change this stance just
because, in the non-CJPTA provinces, some PCFs are more liberal than the
CJPTA presumptions.52
In cases of presence-based jurisdiction, a clear gap exists in relation to
individuals because the CJPTA chose to make ordinary residence, rather than
presence, the test. There is no significant gap as far as claims against a corporation
are concerned, because the CJPTA’s definition of ordinary residence for a
corporation encompassed the common law criterion of carrying on business in
the province, later affirmed in Chevron.53
In reviewing the CJPTA criteria for territorial competence, I have indicated
at the start of each discussion whether I think a judgment of a Canadian court
that took jurisdiction on that ground would be “Hague compliant” in the sense
of meeting the jurisdictional standards in the November 2017 Hague draft. The
answer usually is sometimes, in a few cases it is always, and in some cases it is never.
B. CONSENT
1.

DEFENDANT SUED ON COUNTERCLAIM

Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA gives territorial competence whenever
the defendant is sued on a counterclaim to a proceeding in which that person

51. For example, the PCF, for the purpose of a tort claim, that the claim is connected with a
contract that was made in the province. See Lapointe Rosenstein Marchand Melançon LLP
v Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, 2016 SCC 30, [2016] 1 SCR 851 [Lapointe]. This case
actually relied on the PCF of a contract made in the jurisdiction as supporting jurisdiction in
a tort action, but the result suggests the Court may lean in favour of retaining “necessary or
proper party” as a ground for jurisdiction simpliciter. One decision has already accepted it as
a PCF. See Geophysical Service Inc v Arcis Seismic Solutions Corp, 2015 ABQB 88 at para 42,
20 Alta LR (6th) 112 [Geophysical].
52. Compare the reluctance to import the Muscutt factors. See Laxton v Jurem Anstalt, 2011
BCCA 212 at para 31, 334 DLR (4th) 76 discussing the factors outlined in Muscutt v
Courcelles (2002), 60 OR (3d) 20, 213 DLR (4th) 577 (CA).
53. CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 7(c). There may be nuances. At common law, someone like
an incorporated consultant could carry on business in the jurisdiction without necessarily
having a fixed place of business in the jurisdiction. On the other hand, the Court in Chevron
emphasized that courts “consistently found the maintenance of physical business premises to
be a compelling jurisdictional factor.” See Chevron, supra note 48 at para 85.
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is plaintiff.54 The November 2017 Hague draft qualifies the enforceability of a
judgment on such a counterclaim. To the extent that the counterclaim succeeds,
the judgment is enforceable only if the counterclaim “arose out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the claim.”55 This is a qualification not present
in the CJPTA. Whether a counterclaim can be brought if it arises out of an
unrelated transaction depends on the local rules. It does appear likely that some
counterclaims that would fit under the CJPTA rule would not meet the “same
transaction or occurrence” test under the November 2017 Hague draft, such as
when the defendant in a contract action counterclaims based on an unrelated
debt that the plaintiff owes the defendant.
2.

SUBMISSION IN THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Sometimes Hague compliant. The expression used in the CJPTA provision
is that the defendant “submits to the court’s jurisdiction” in the course of the
proceeding.56 This must be compared with the combination of two jurisdictional
grounds in the November 2017 Hague draft. One says: “expressly consented
to the jurisdiction of the court of origin in the course of the proceedings.”57
This is narrower than the CJPTA provision because submission in the Canadian
sense can take place by conduct that implicitly accepts the jurisdiction of the
court without clearly qualifying as “express consent.” The Hague grounds also
include one that the Special Commission added to the Working Group’s draft
in 201658 and retained in revised form in the November 2017 Hague draft.59
It is that the defendant “argued on the merits before the court of origin without
contesting jurisdiction within the timeframe provided in the law of the State of
origin, unless it is evident that an objection to jurisdiction or to the exercise of
jurisdiction would not have succeeded under that law.”60 The expression “argued
on the merits” covers most of the situations in which, according to the Canadian

54. CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 3(a).
55. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(l)(i). To the extent that the
counterclaim fails, it must be recognized “unless the law of the State of origin required the
counterclaim to be filed in order to avoid preclusion.” Ibid, art 5(1)(l)(ii).
56. CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 3(b).
57. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(e).
58. 2016 Hague draft, supra note 18, art 5(1)(f ).
59. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(f ). The 2016 version, which was in
brackets, used “entered an appearance” rather than “argued on the merits.” See 2016 Hague
draft, supra note 18, art 5(1)(f ).
60. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(f ).
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case law, a defendant implicitly accepts jurisdiction, but perhaps not all of them.61
The very significant qualification that arguing on the merits does not give the
court jurisdiction if the defendant had no viable way to contest jurisdiction has
no equivalent in Canadian law.
It is worth noting that the November 2017 Hague draft would restrict the
“express consent” ground to consent that “was addressed to the court, orally or
in writing,” if the person said to be bound by the judgment is a consumer being
sued on a consumer contract or an employee being sued on an employment
contract.62 It would also exclude such consumer and employment judgments
from the “argued on the merits” jurisdictional ground altogether.63
3.

AGREEMENT THAT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION

To avoid overlap between the 2005 Choice of Court Convention and the proposed
general judgments convention, the November 2017 Hague draft does not
deal with submission under an exclusive choice of court agreement, which is
the preserve of the Choice of Court Convention.64 Any agreement designating a
court or courts of one contracting state is deemed to be exclusive unless the
parties expressly provide otherwise.65 A court designated in a valid exclusive
choice of court agreement has jurisdiction and cannot decline it in favour of a
court in another state.66 A judgment of a court that is exclusively chosen must be
recognized and enforced,67 subject only to fairly standard defences such as fraud
and public policy.68
Where jurisdiction was taken on the basis of a non-exclusive choice of court
agreement, recognition and enforcement are mandatory under the Choice of
Court Convention only if both the state of origin and the requested state have
made declarations that they are prepared to recognize and enforce judgments
where jurisdiction is taken on such a basis.69 A state that signs on to the proposed
judgments convention will, however, bind itself to enforce a judgment “given by
61. Such as when the defendant writes the court a letter responding to the notice of the
proceeding, as the Thivys did in Beals, which Justice LeBel said was attornment. See Beals,
supra note 47 at para 147.
62. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(2)(a).
63. Ibid, art 5(2)(b).
64. Choice of Court Convention, supra note 14, art 1(1).
65. Ibid, art 3(b).
66. Ibid, art 5(1)-(2).
67. Ibid, art 8(1).
68. Ibid, art 9.
69. Ibid, art 22.
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a court designated in an agreement concluded or documented in writing … other
than an exclusive choice of court agreement.”70 This supplement to the Choice of
Court Convention is consistent with the principle of consent, which the CJPTA
also embodies when it says that a court has territorial competence if “there is an
agreement between the plaintiff and [the defendant] to the effect that the court
has jurisdiction in the proceeding.”71
C. ORDINARY RESIDENCE
1.

INDIVIDUALS

Always Hague compliant. Both ordinary residence (the CJPTA test)72 and
habitual residence (the November 2017 Hague draft test)73 have been applied
for many years by Canadian courts, especially in family matters, and they are
generally treated as equivalent. Assuming that they are, a judgment in any case in
which territorial competence was based on an individual’s ordinary residence will
comply with the habitual residence criterion in the November 2017 Hague draft.
The 1999 Hague draft (the mixed convention draft) also used habitual
residence as the basic jurisdictional test,74 and specifically prohibited jurisdiction
based on the defendant’s temporary residence or presence in the state.75 The
negotiations the following year showed disagreement on whether the term used
should be “residence” or “habitual residence.”76 And in case “residence” were
to be chosen, a bracketed provision was inserted to select the state of principal
residence, if possible, from among multiple residences.77
2.

CORPORATIONS AND OTHER ENTITIES

Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA follows the common law tradition
of treating a corporation as present in the province if it does business or has
an agent for service there. Because the Hague model, following the civil law
pattern, makes habitual residence (not presence) the basic ground for personal
70. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(m). This jurisdictional ground was not
in the 2016 draft.
71. CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 3(c).
72. Ibid, s 3(d).
73. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(a).
74. 1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 3(1).
75. Ibid, art 18(2)(d).
76. 2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, art 3(1).
77. Ibid, art 3(2). Article 3(2)(b)(ii) would have allowed the defendant to be resident in multiple
states if there was no principal residence.
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jurisdiction, the test for corporate habitual residence is aimed at selecting only
the state or states (a corporation, like an individual, can have more than one
habitual residence) in which the corporation is in some sense based.78 The criteria
have been the same throughout the Hague projects since the 1999 Hague draft.79
A corporation is habitually resident in a state if it has its statutory seat there, was
incorporated there, had its central administration there, or had its principal place
of business there.80 Only one of these—the place of central administration—is
also used in the CJPTA.81 The CJPTA uses three other alternative criteria that
would usually not make the corporation habitually resident in the Hague sense:
(1) being required by law to have a registered office in the province; (2) having,
pursuant to law, registered an address or an agent in the province for service of
process; and (3) having a place of business in the province.82
The four Hague criteria for habitual residence apply not only to corporations
but also to an “entity or person other than a natural person,” such as unincorporated
associations and partnerships.83 The CJPTA deals separately with them, again
regarding them as ordinarily resident if, among other things, they have a place of
business or, if they do not do business, a place where they conduct their activities
in the province.84 They would not be habitually resident on the Hague test on
that basis alone.
The Hague model, again by analogy with individuals, treats jurisdiction as
against a corporation or other entity that is not habitually resident in the state,
but does have a presence there, as assumed jurisdiction. Under the November
78. Compare the criterion used of the corporation’s being “at home,” which the US Supreme
Court has adopted as the basis for general jurisdiction as against a corporation. See Daimler
AG v Bauman, 134 S Ct 746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations SA v Brown,
564 US 915 (2011). See also Tanya J Monestier, “Where Is Home Depot ‘At Home’?:
Daimler v. Bauman and the End of Doing Business Jurisdiction” (2014) 66:1 Hastings
LJ 233. Because of the due process requirements for general jurisdiction, as applied in
these cases, the US common law on this issue is much closer to the Hague model than the
Canadian common law is.
79. 1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 3(2).
80. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 3(2).
81. CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 7(d).
82. Ibid, ss 7(a), (b) and (c), respectively. Having a place of business in the province is judged
on fairly flexible lines. See Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 1 at 83. Black, Pitel & Sobkin
note Borgstrom v Korean Air Lines Co Ltd, 2006 BCSC 1690, 153 ACWS (3d) 576, rev’d on
other grounds 2007 BCCA 263, 70 BCLR (4th) 206, in which an airline was found to have
a place of business in British Columbia because it flew airplanes regularly into Vancouver and
had ten employees posted there to handle the planes.
83. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 3(2).
84. CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, ss 8-9.
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2017 draft, if a defendant maintains a branch, agency, or other establishment85
in the state of origin at the time the defendant becomes a party to the proceeding,
there is jurisdiction if the claim on which the judgment is based arose out of the
activities of that branch, agency, or other establishment.86 This, of course, is the
qualification that the Supreme Court of Canada refused, in the Chevron case,
to add to jurisdiction based on a corporation’s presence in the province.87
D. ASSUMED JURISDICTION: PRESUMED REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL
CONNECTION

From the point of view of the enforceability of an eventual judgment, the assumed
jurisdiction grounds come into play only if the defendant does not submit to
the jurisdiction. The CJPTA, following the Morguard principle, adopted the
real and substantial connection as the sine qua non of assumed jurisdiction.88
The overwhelming majority of cases are taken care of by the listed categories of
presumed real and substantial connection.89 Of the twelve paragraphs of the list,
four deal with subject matter that is largely or entirely excluded from the scope
of the November 2017 Hague draft, and was also excluded from the 1999 and
2001 mixed convention drafts.90
The fifth paragraph, which presumes there to be a real and substantial
connection if the proceeding is for the enforcement of a judgment or arbitral
award from outside the province,91 does not feature in the November 2017
Hague draft because the latter is confined to enforcing judgments in the sense
of a decision on the merits,92 not judgments that enforce other judgments or
awards. Jurisdiction in foreign judgment proceedings was touched on in the
85. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(d). Article 5(1)(d) stipulates that the
branch, agency or other establishment must be “without separate legal personality.” The use
of jurisdiction over subsidiaries to get at parent companies was an issue in 2001. See 2001
Hague draft, supra note 12, art 9 and accompanying footnotes.
86. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(d).
87. But it is included in the Civil Code of Québec. See art 3148(2) CCQ.
88. CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 3(e).
89. Ibid, s 10.
90. See ibid, ss 10(b), (c), (l), (j). Section 10(b) and (c) are concerned with matters of succession
law, though the latter may apply to some inter vivos transactions (excluded by November
2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 2(1)(d)); section 10(j) concerns status and capacity of
a natural person (excluded by November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 2(1)(a)); and
section 10(l) concerns recovery of taxes and revenue matters (excluded by November 2017
Hague draft, supra note 19, art 1(1)).
91. CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(k).
92. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 3(1)(b).

278

(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

mixed convention drafts, not by specifying when a court had jurisdiction in such
proceedings—that was left by silence to national law—but rather by stipulating
in the “black list” of prohibited grounds that a judgment creditor’s bringing of
such a proceeding in a state would not give that state’s court jurisdiction in a
matter not directly related to the enforcement proceeding.93
I will review the remaining seven paragraphs briefly, indicating how far the
jurisdictional bases will fit the criteria in the November 2017 Hague draft.
1.

RIGHTS IN PROPERTY IN THE PROVINCE

Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA gives territorial competence against
a non-resident defendant if the proceeding “is brought to enforce, assert, declare
or determine proprietary or possessory rights or a security interest in property in
British Columbia that is immovable or movable.”94 The November 2017 Hague
draft recognizes no jurisdiction based on the claim having to do with rights in
movable property situated within the state.95 There are two provisions relating
to claims to rights in immovables. One recognizes jurisdiction if a judgment
rules on a tenancy of immovable property in the state of origin.96 The other
is the provision, already referred to in Part III, above,97 that gives the court of
the situs exclusive jurisdiction to rule on rights in rem in immovable property.98
The CJPTA’s “proprietary or possessory rights” in an immovable would cover
claims to in rem rights and tenancies, as would claims to a security interest in
an immovable that amounts to a right in rem because it is an interest in the
land.99 There may be some types of security interests in immovables that are
within the CJPTA presumption but outside the Hague criteria because they are
not rights in rem.

93. 1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 18(2)(h). Compare 2001 Hague draft, supra note 12,
art 18(2)(h) (where two versions are proposed).
94. CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(a).
95. See Tucows.com Co v Lojas Renner SA, 2011 ONCA 548, 106 OR (3d) 561, leave to appeal
to SCC refused, 34481 (24 May 2012). Jurisdiction would not be recognized on the sole
basis that the domain name at issue was movable property in Ontario.
96. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(h).
97. It is discussed in the text accompanying notes 33-35.
98. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 6(b).
99. Like the mortgages that were at issue in Hogg v Provincial Tax Commission, [1941] 4 DLR
501, [1941] 3 WWR 605 (Sask CA).
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2.

TRUSTS

Sometimes Hague compliant. Both the CJPTA and the November 2017 Hague
draft have fairly elaborate provisions about jurisdiction relating to trusts. They
overlap but do not coincide. The November 2017 Hague draft provision is limited
to trusts “created voluntarily and evidenced in writing,”100 whereas the CJPTA
paragraph applies to any trust, including one imposed by law or created orally.101
To take the four CJPTA grounds concerning trusts in turn, the first is that
relief against a trustee (wherever resident) is claimed only as to trust assets,
whether movable or immovable, in the province.102 This is not a ground under
the November 2017 Hague draft. The second is that the trustee is ordinarily
resident in the province.103 This may be covered by the general November 2017
Hague draft provision that “the person against whom recognition or enforcement
is sought was habitually resident” in the state of origin.104 The third is that the
administration of the trust is principally carried on in the province.105 This would
usually correspond to the November 2017 Hague draft criterion that the trust
instrument expressly or impliedly designates the state of origin as the state in which
the principal place of administration of the trust is situated.106 The November
2017 Hague draft provision refers to where the principal administration should
take place according to the trust instrument, whereas the CJPTA provision refers
to where it actually takes place. The fourth CJPTA ground is that by the express
terms of a trust document, the trust is governed by the law of the province.107
The governing law of the trust is not a jurisdictional basis under the November
2017 Hague draft.108
In one of the rare instances of the Hague jurisdictional criteria covering a
situation the CJPTA presumptions do not cover, the November 2017 Hague
draft recognizes a judgment if the state of origin was designated in the trust
instrument as a state (not necessarily the only state) in which disputes about
such matters are to be determined.109 Even though this exact ground is not in the
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(k).
CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(d).
Ibid, s 10(d)(i).
Ibid, s 10(d)(ii).
November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(a).
CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(d)(iii).
November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(k)(ii).
CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(d)(iv).
It was included in the February 2017 Hague draft. See February 2017 Hague draft, supra
note 19, art 5(1)(n)(ii). This ground does not appear in the November 2017 Hague draft.
109. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(k)(i).
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CJPTA, in almost every case where a trust does say that disputes about the trust
could be litigated in the province, it seems more than likely that one or other of
the existing CJPTA presumptions would give territorial competence (place of
administration, express choice of governing law, et cetera).110
The 1999 Hague draft has one other ground relating to trusts, which is that
a court would have jurisdiction if the trust had its closest connection with the
forum state.111 The 2001 Hague draft expands this by adding some factors to
be taken into account in determining the closest connection.112 It also adds a
further jurisdictional ground, which is that the settlor, if living, and all living
beneficiaries were all habitually resident in the forum state.113
3.

CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS

Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA has only two general jurisdictional
presumptions relating to contractual obligations.114 Territorial competence exists
if the contractual obligations with which the proceeding is concerned were,
to a substantial extent, to be performed in the province.115 It also exists if, by its
express terms, the contract is governed by the law of the province.116 There is
a third presumption relating specifically to consumer contracts, defined as
contracts for the purchase of property or services for use other than in the course
of the purchaser’s trade or profession.117 Territorial competence is presumed to
exist if the contract resulted from a solicitation of business in the province on
behalf of the seller.118
110. Further, there is always the “residual” real and substantial connection if there is an
express choice of a forum in the province for trust disputes, but none of the existing
presumptions apply.
111. 1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 11(2)(c).
112. 2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, art 11(2)(c).
113. Ibid, art 11(2)(d).
114. Saskatchewan has a third general jurisdictional presumption, namely, that the contract was
made in Saskatchewan. See CJPTA (SK), supra note 1, s 9(e)(ii). This may be because the
Saskatchewan version of the act followed an earlier ULCC draft rather than the final one. See
Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 1 at 35-36. The place of contracting has (unfortunately,
in my view) attracted the Supreme Court of Canada, which declared it to be a presumptive
connecting factor even in tort cases if the tort was connected with the contract. See Club
Resorts, supra note 49; Lapointe, supra note 51 at para 36. The place of signing a contract
was on the “black list” in the 1999 Hague draft. See 1999 Hague draft, supra note
11, art 18(2)(j).
115. CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(e)(i).
116. Ibid, s 10(e)(ii).
117. Ibid, s 10(e)(iii)(A).
118. Ibid, s 10(e)(iii)(B).
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The November 2017 Hague draft also recognizes jurisdiction based on where
a contract was or should have been performed, but without the “to a substantial
extent” qualification. Performance of the obligation in issue must have taken
place, or ought to have taken place, in the forum state.119 The November 2017
Hague draft does, however, add another qualification, one that is unusual in
that it is phrased in the style of US law and is probably directed at due process
concerns.120 The fact that the forum state was the place of performance does not
give jurisdiction if “the defendant’s activities in relation to the transaction clearly
did not constitute a purposeful and substantial connection to that state.”121
This wording is in the Working Group draft; the group suggests that the use
of “purposeful” might need further elaboration and discussion by the Special
Commission,122 but the latter left the wording alone.123 The 1999 and 2001
Hague drafts are quite different. The first has a rule based strictly on the place
of performance.124 The second adds an alternative version based on the contract
being “directly related” to “frequent [and/or] significant activity” in the state.125
Whether to include “activity jurisdiction” was one of the main sticking points in
the 2000–2001 negotiations.
Assumed jurisdiction based on the contract’s being governed by the law of
the state of origin does not exist under the November 2017 Hague draft.
It is worth noting that there is a specific provision, in brackets, that could have
been designed for the Morguard case; the court had jurisdiction if the judgment
ruled on a contractual obligation secured by a right in rem in immovable property
in the state, if the claim was brought together with a claim relating to that right.126
The November 2017 draft provides that assumed jurisdiction based on the
place of performance does not exist if the person sought to be bound is a consumer
or an employee.127 This is one of only two places in which the November 2017
draft deals with the special jurisdictional problems relating to contract actions

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(g).
See Brand, “Due Process,” supra note 13.
November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(g).
April 2016 Explanatory Note, supra note 17 at para 96.
The Special Commission also deployed a modified version of it in other provisions. See
November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, arts 5(3)(a), (b). See also supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 6.
2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, art 6, Alternative A. Two variant paragraphs would have
elaborated on what “activity” meant.
November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(i).
Ibid, art 5(2)(b).
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brought against consumers and employees.128 The 1999 Hague draft, no doubt
influenced by the Brussels Convention model, has special jurisdictional rules for
both categories of contract, dealing with actions brought by, as well as against,
the consumer or employee.129 The 2001 Hague draft reflects acute controversies
about the consumer provisions; there were now multiple alternative and variant
proposals. Commission II had not got to the employment provisions.130
4.

RESTITUTIONARY OBLIGATIONS

Never Hague compliant. The November 2017 Hague draft has no provision
recognizing jurisdiction based on the place where restitutionary obligations
arose that would be analogous to the presumption in the CJPTA.131 There is a
jurisdictional principle based on where a non-contractual obligation arose,132 but
that provision, discussed in Part IV(D)(5) below, is limited to claims for physical
injury. The 1999 and 2001 mixed convention drafts did not have a provision for
restitutionary claims either.
5.

TORT

Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA presumes territorial competence,
based on a real and substantial connection, if the proceeding concerns a tort
committed in the province. Canadian law has been especially liberal when it comes
to assumed jurisdiction in tort claims. The locus of the tort, for jurisdictional
purposes, can be in any country that was substantially affected by the defendant’s
activities or their consequences, provided that the law of that country is likely
to have been in the reasonable contemplation of the parties.133 In Club Resorts134
and Lapointe,135 the Supreme Court of Canada went beyond the CJPTA when it
held that jurisdiction in a tort claim could be based, not on where the tort was
committed, but on the place of making of a contract with which the tort was
connected. This notion of “connection” is a flexible one.

128. For the other, see November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(2)(a). See also the text
accompanying supra note 62.
129. 1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, arts 7-8.
130. 2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, arts 7-8.
131. CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(f ).
132. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(j).
133. Moran v Pyle National (Canada) Ltd, [1975] 1 SCR 393 at 408-09, 43 DLR
(3d) 239 [Moran].
134. Club Resorts, supra note 49.
135. Lapointe, supra note 51.
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The November 2017 Hague draft, by sharp contrast, is very conservative
when it comes to assumed jurisdiction in tort claims. It eschews economic claims
altogether, thereby cutting out (among others) almost all negligent or fraudulent
misrepresentation claims, the locus of which, for jurisdictional purposes, is often
litigated in Canada.136 The exclusion of defamation claims, another fertile source
of jurisdictional disputes in Canadian courts, was referred to earlier in Part III,
above.137 It also settles firmly on a place of acting test. The rule recognizes only
judgments based on a “non-contractual obligation arising from death, physical
injury, damage to or loss of tangible property, [if ] the act or omission directly
causing such harm occurred in the State of origin, irrespective of where that harm
occurred.”138 By this test, default judgments based on the jurisdictional grounds
approved in many of the leading Canadian cases, including Moran139 and Club
Resorts,140 would not have been enforceable under the November 2017 Hague
draft provision.
The 1999 Hague draft, for the mixed convention, was much closer to
the Canadian position. It would have included in the “white list” of required
jurisdictional grounds a tort claim where the act or omission occurred in the
state, or where the injury arose in the state, unless the defendant can show that it
could not reasonably have been foreseen that the act or omission could result in
an injury of that nature in that state.141 The 2001 Hague draft included another
provision, bracketed, that parallels the activity-based ground proposed for
jurisdiction in contract claims.142 Jurisdiction could be based on the defendant’s
having “engaged in frequent or significant activity” in the forum state if the tort
claim arose out of that activity.143
136. See e.g. Central Sun Mining Inc v Vector Engineering Inc, 2013 ONCA 601 at para 35, 117
OR (3d) 313, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 35640 (13 March 2014).
137. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 2(1)(k). See also the text
accompanying supra note 31.
138. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(j).
139. Moran, supra note 133.
140. Club Resorts, supra note 49. In neither of the two cases decided in Club Resorts was
jurisdiction taken based on the tort having been committed in Ontario, and so they would
not have fitted under the CJPTA presumption. They could have been cases where a “residual”
real and substantial connection might be shown.
141. 1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 10(1).
142. See 2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, art 6, Alternative A. See also the text accompanying
supra note 125.
143. Ibid, art 10(2). The provision would also have required that “the overall connection of
the defendant to that State makes it reasonable that the defendant be subject to suit
in that State.”
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6.

BUSINESS CARRIED ON

Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA presumes territorial competence if
the proceeding concerns a business carried on in the province.144 This ground is
not often needed when it comes to suing a corporation, because the CJPTA’s tests
for the ordinary residence of a corporation include the fact that the corporation
had a place of business in the province. So this presumption comes into play
only if the claim concerns a business carried on in the province by a corporation
that does not have a “place” of business there and is not otherwise ordinarily
resident there, or a business carried on by an individual who is ordinarily resident
elsewhere. The November 2017 Hague draft does not recognize jurisdiction on
the basis of a corporation’s doing business other than through a branch, agency or
other establishment.145 It does have a provision for jurisdiction based on a natural
person’s having his or her principal place of business (not just a place of business)
in the forum state, if the claim arose out of the business done there.146
7.

INJUNCTION

Never Hague compliant. The CJPTA presumes there to be a real and substantial
connection if the plaintiff claims an injunction ordering a party to do, or refrain
from doing, anything in the province, or in relation to immovable or movable
property in the province.147 The November 2017 Hague draft has no corresponding
ground.148 The 1999 Hague draft and 2001 Hague draft dealt with jurisdiction to
issue injunctions only as provisional or protective measures.149

144. CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(h).
145. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(d). See also the text
accompanying supra note 86.
146. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(b).
147. CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(i).
148. Injunctions are within the range of judgments recognized or enforced under the proposed
convention. It includes a “decree or order” within the scope of “judgment.” See November
2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 3(1)(b). The injunction would have to be a permanent
one, given after a decision on the merits as the same provision of the November 2017 Hague
draft states that interim measures of protection are not included. See ibid.
149. 1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 13. In the 2001 Hague draft, opinion was divided on
whether the convention should exclude provisional and protective measures from its scope
altogether or, as the 1999 draft had proposed, specifically provide for jurisdiction to order
protective measures that have effect only within the state of the court that orders them, and
are designed to protect a claim on the merits. See 2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, arts 1(2)
(k), 13, Alternatives A and B.
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E.

ASSUMED JURISDICTION—RESIDUAL REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL
CONNECTION

Using the November 2017 Hague draft as the basis for comparison, there would
be very few Hague-compliant grounds of jurisdiction that would lie outside
the CJPTA’s listed presumptions, and so would support jurisdiction under the
CJPTA only on the basis of a residual (affirmatively shown) real and substantial
connection. One example would be the bracketed ground for recognizing a
judgment ruling on the validity of a copyright or other unregistered IP rights
solely on the basis that the state of origin’s law governed the right.150 It would be
rare, though not impossible, for such claims to find their way into the court of a
province as distinct from the Federal Court, and so the CJPTA would practically
never be involved.151
F.

ASSUMED JURISDICTION: FORUM OF NECESSITY

None of the Hague drafts include the concept of forum of necessity, which is
understandable, given that it is controversial even within a legal system such as
Canada’s. A judgment based on the CJPTA forum of necessity provision152 would
not be Hague compliant.

V. DECLINING JURISDICTION
A. FORUM NON CONVENIENS

It is worth noting briefly the extent to which the CJPTA’s forum non conveniens
provisions153 fit into the Hague discussions. For obvious reasons, the November
2017 Hague draft, which is concerned only with recognition and enforcement
of judgments, does not touch on declining jurisdiction. The discretion to decline
jurisdiction is generally not a significant part of the jurisdictional system in
civil law countries, and does not form part of the Brussels system. Nevertheless,
it is included in the 1999 Hague draft for the mixed convention. That draft
150. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(3)(c). Jurisdiction based on the place
of infringement, as provided in article 5(3)(a) (registered rights) and article 5(3)(b)
(non-registered rights) would probably fall within the “tort committed in [the province]”
presumption in the CJPTA. See ibid, art 5(3)(a), (b); CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(g).
151. For a case where copyright infringement claims were brought against non-resident
defendants, although in a non-CJPTA province, see Geophysical, supra note 51.
152. CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 6. The forum of necessity section was omitted in the CJPTA
(SK), supra note 1. See also Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 1 at 174-77.
153. CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 11.
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convention would have permitted a court in a contracting state, in “exceptional
circumstances,” to suspend its proceedings if it was “clearly inappropriate” for
the court to exercise jurisdiction and another state’s court was “clearly more
appropriate to resolve the dispute.”154 If the other court took jurisdiction, the first
court would then decline jurisdiction.155 This provision survived almost intact
into the 2001 Hague draft.156 The references to “exceptional circumstances” and
“clearly inappropriate” seem to make the standard for declining jurisdiction
somewhat higher than the CJPTA’s.157 Even the alternative forum’s being “clearly
more appropriate” is stricter than the CJPTA’s “more appropriate,”158 although
the common law has sanctified the “clearly more appropriate” test and courts
tend to equate the CJPTA test with it.159
B. PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS

The CJPTA, like the common law, has no principle of lis alibi pendens. The
forum non conveniens provisions of the CJPTA therefore apply to cases in which
proceedings on the same matter between the same parties have been brought
elsewhere, as the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed in the Teck case.160
Because it only proposes a recognition and enforcement convention, the
November 2017 Hague draft does not have to deal with lis alibi pendens. It does,
however, have a provision permitting the requested state to refuse or postpone
recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment that is otherwise entitled to
it, if proceedings between the same parties on the subject matter are pending
before a court in that state, provided that the local court was seized before the
court of origin and there is a close connection between the dispute and the
154. 1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 22.
155. Ibid.
156. 2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, art 22. See Ronald A Brand, “Comparative Forum Non
Conveniens and the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments” (2002) 37:3
Tex Intl LJ 467.
157. Black, supra note 11 at 260. The “clearly inappropriate” element has affinities with the
Australian law on forum non conveniens. See Justin Paul Cook, “Declining Jurisdiction in The
Hague’s Proposed Judgments Convention: Amalgamating the ‘More Appropriate Forum’
and the ‘Clearly Inappropriate Forum’ Tests to Provide the Optimal Forum Non Conveniens
Clause” (2014) 21 Aust ILJ 19.
158. “More appropriate” is the standard in both sections 11(1) and (2). See CJPTA (BC), supra
note 1, ss 11(1), (2).
159. See Club Resorts, supra note 49 at paras 108-109; Colonial Countertops Ltd v Maple Terrazzo
Marble & Tile Inc, 2014 BCSC 752 at paras 25-29, [2014] 11 WWR 827.
160. Teck Cominco Metals Ltd v Lloyd’s Underwriters, 2009 SCC 11 at paras 21-22, 29, [2009] 1
SCR 321 [Teck].
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requested state.161 The Permanent Bureau’s commentary notes that jurisdictions
differ on whether a pending local proceeding is pre-empted by a foreign judgment
that is entitled to recognition.162 Hence, this provision is worded in permissive
rather than mandatory terms.
The 1999 Hague draft for the mixed convention includes a rule that the
court second seized must suspend jurisdiction in favour of the court first seized,163
subject to two exceptions. One is where the action in the court first seized is for
a determination that the plaintiff has no obligation to the defendant whereas
the action in the other court seeks substantive relief; in that case the court first
seized must suspend the proceedings.164 The other is where the court first seized,
on application by a party, determines that the court second seized is “clearly more
appropriate to resolve the dispute.”165 The article would not allow, as in Teck, the
court second seized to refuse to decline jurisdiction because it considers itself to
be clearly the more appropriate forum. The article survived into the 2001 Hague
draft with only minor amendments.166

VI. CONCLUSION
The short answer to the question of whether the CJPTA’s rules will cause difficulty
if a Hague convention on foreign judgments comes into force along the lines of
the November 2017 Hague draft is no. The CJPTA’s jurisdictional rules are in
many respects wider than the jurisdictional grounds recognized in the November
2017 Hague draft, but that would not prevent judgments from being recognized
under the convention if the facts brought the judgment within the Hague
grounds. If recognition and enforcement abroad is important to the parties, they
can usually know in advance whether the judgment would be Hague compliant.
161. November 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 7(2). The Working Group’s draft also
provided that recognition could be refused or postponed, even if the dispute were not
closely connected with the requested state, if the proceedings before the court of origin were
“brought for the purpose of frustrating the effectiveness of the pending proceedings.” See
Working Group draft, supra note 17, art 7(2)(b). The Special Commission deleted this part
of article 7(2).
162. April 2016 Explanatory Note, supra note 17 at para 171. Quebec and Saskatchewan are listed
as jurisdictions favouring the local proceeding whereas the other Canadian jurisdictions are
listed as favouring recognition of the foreign judgment. Ibid, nn 81, 82.
163. 1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 21(1). The court first seized must be “expected to
render a judgment capable of being recognised” under the convention.
164. Ibid, art 21(6).
165. Ibid, art 21(7).
166. 2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, art 21(7).
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There would be little reason to narrow the jurisdictional grounds in the
CJPTA in an attempt to bring it closer to a Hague compliant jurisdictional
system. There would be no real benefit in terms of certainty of operation of the
CJPTA itself; the existing CJPTA seems to be working reasonably predictably. Nor
would it gain wider acceptance for our judgments abroad, since the recognition
and enforcement convention, like the common law, does not make jurisdiction
depend on the ground on which the foreign court actually took jurisdiction but
on whether the ground was present in fact. The cost of a disparity between the
CJPTA jurisdictional system and a Hague system is that litigants who care about
recognition or enforcement of a judgment elsewhere cannot rely on the CJPTA’s
grounds as a guarantee that a judgment will be effective abroad. However, this is
the present situation and, Hague or no Hague, we will almost certainly have to
keep living with it.
Two other considerations come into play as well. One, which relates to a
point referred to in Part V(A) above,167 is that the domestic jurisdictional grounds
are structured as they are because they include a robust discretion to decline
jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens. To recast the grounds along
the lines of the grounds found in the November 2017 Hague draft judgments
convention would ignore this fundamental structural feature. The other
consideration is that one of the main roles of the CJPTA is to define jurisdiction
vis-à-vis other provinces. This the CJPTA does, following in a reasonable way the
constitutional limits on jurisdiction limits that, in retrospect, were interpreted
fairly conservatively. To narrow the CJPTA jurisdictional grounds under the
influence of a Hague convention would, therefore, in a sense, put the international
cart before the interprovincial horse.168
It is hard to imagine any scenario in which the Hague system and the
common law jurisdictional systems, of which the CJPTA is part, will be brought
close enough together to allow them to merge into one integrated whole. Even if a
Hague convention on jurisdiction, separate from the recognition and enforcement
of judgments convention currently being negotiated, comes to pass, it will almost
167. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
168. The international cart may also eventually take more than one form. Since 2005, the
Commonwealth Law Ministers have been developing a Model Law for the recognition of
judgments among the Commonwealth nations. The Ministers considered a draft in 2014.
See Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers and Senior Officials, Final Communiqué
(Gabarone, Botswana: 5-8 May 2014), online: <thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/
inline/Commonwealth_Law_Ministers_Meeting_2014_Communique.pdf>. Further
work is proceeding. The drafters have drawn on both the Hague model and the work of
Commonwealth law reform agencies. See ibid at para 9.
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certainly leave states free to use jurisdictional grounds that do not comply with
the “white list” in the convention. There may or may not be an agreed “black
list” of prohibited grounds of jurisdiction. Even if the black list in the 1999
Hague draft169 were to be replicated in a new convention, it would not ban any
of the grounds of assumed jurisdiction listed as presumed real and substantial
connections in the CJPTA.170 It is possible that such a convention could require
some adjustments, probably not radical ones, to forum non conveniens and lis alibi
pendens rules. Very probably, therefore, the CJPTA could function perfectly well
even if Canada became a party to an eventual Hague jurisdiction convention.
Disparities between the CJPTA and the Hague system, whatever it may
become, seem to be less of a concern than the growing disparities, the result of
the evolution of the common law, between the CJPTA and non-CJPTA systems
within Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada’s desire, as expressed in Club
Resorts,171 to harmonize the two as far as possible seems to have faded,172 much to
the detriment of the Canadian jurisdictional system as a whole.

169. 1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 18(2).
170. Except Saskatchewan’s presumption based on the place a contract is made. See CJPTA (SK),
supra note 1, s 9(e)(ii).
171. Club Resorts, supra note 49.
172. As evidenced most notably in Lapointe, supra note 51. In Lapointe, the Court expanded
considerably a presumptive jurisdictional ground (the place of making of a contract) that was
deliberately omitted in the CJPTA.
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VII. APPENDIX
Hague Conference on Private International Law
Special Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement
Foreign Judgments
November 2017 Draft Convention (“November 2017 Hague draft”)

of

CHAPTER I – SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
Article 1
Scope
1. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of
judgments relating to civil or commercial matters. It shall not extend in
particular to revenue, customs or administrative matters.
2. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement
in one Contracting State of a judgment given by a court of another
Contracting State.
Article 2
Exclusions from scope
1. This Convention shall not apply to the following matters –
a. the status and legal capacity of natural persons;
b. maintenance obligations;
c. other family law matters, including matrimonial property regimes
and other rights or obligations arising out of marriage or similar
relationships;
d. wills and succession;
e. insolvency, composition, resolution of financial institutions, and
analogous matters;
f. the carriage of passengers and goods;
g. marine pollution, limitation of liability for maritime claims, general
average, and emergency towage and salvage;
h. liability for nuclear damage;
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i.

2.

3.
4.
5.

the validity, nullity, or dissolution of legal persons or associations of
natural or legal persons, and the validity of decisions of their organs;
j. the validity of entries in public registers;
k. defamation ;
l. privacy / unauthorised public disclosure of information relating
to private life];
m. intellectual property rights [and analogous matters]].
A judgment is not excluded from the scope of this Convention where
a matter to which this Convention does not apply arose merely as a
preliminary question in the proceedings in which the judgment was
given, and not as an object of the proceedings. In particular, the mere
fact that such a matter arose by way of defence does not exclude a
judgment from the Convention, if that matter was not an object of
the proceedings.
This Convention shall not apply to arbitration and related proceedings.
A judgment is not excluded from the scope of this Convention by the
mere fact that a State, including a government, a governmental agency
or any person acting for a State, was a party to the proceedings.
Nothing in this Convention shall affect privileges and immunities of
States or of international organisations, in respect of themselves and of
their property.
Article 3
Definitions

1. In this Convention –
a. “defendant” means a person against whom the claim or counterclaim
was brought in the State of origin;
b. “judgment” means any decision on the merits given by a court,
whatever it may be called, including a decree or order, and a
determination of costs or expenses by the court (including an officer
of the court), provided that the determination relates to a decision
on the merits which may be recognised or enforced under this
Convention. An interim measure of protection is not a judgment.
2. An entity or person other than a natural person shall be considered to be
habitually resident in the State –
a. where it has its statutory seat;
b. under whose law it was incorporated or formed;
c. where it has its central administration; or
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d. where it has its principal place of business.
CHAPTER II – RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
Article 4
General provisions
1. A judgment given by a court of a Contracting State (State of origin)
shall be recognised and enforced in another Contracting State (requested
State) in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. Recognition
or enforcement may be refused only on the grounds specified in
this Convention.
2. Without prejudice to such review as is necessary for the application of
the provisions of this Chapter, there shall be no review of the merits of
the judgment given by the court of origin.
3. A judgment shall be recognised only if it has effect in the State of origin,
and shall be enforced only if it is enforceable in the State of origin.
4. If a judgment referred to in paragraph 3 is the subject of review in the
State of origin or if the time limit for seeking ordinary review has not
expired, the court addressed may –
a. grant recognition or enforcement, which enforcement may be
conditional on the provision of such security as it shall determine;
b. postpone the decision on recognition or enforcement; or
c. refuse the recognition or enforcement.
5. A refusal under sub-paragraph does not prevent a subsequent application
for recognition or enforcement of the judgment.
Article 5
Bases for recognition and enforcement
1. A judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if one of the
following requirements is met –
a. the person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought was
habitually resident in the State of origin at the time that person
became a party to the proceedings in the court of origin;
b. the natural person against whom recognition or enforcement is
sought had his or her principal place of business in the State of
origin at the time that person became a party to the proceedings in
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the court of origin and the claim on which the judgment is based
arose out of the activities of that business;
c. the person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought
is the person that brought the claim, other than a counterclaim,
on which the judgment is based;
d. the defendant maintained a branch, agency, or other establishment
without separate legal personality in the State of origin at the time
that person became a party to the proceedings in the court of
origin, and the claim on which the judgment is based arose out of
the activities of that branch, agency, or establishment;
e. the defendant expressly consented to the jurisdiction of the
court of origin in the course of the proceedings in which the
judgment was given;
f. the defendant argued on the merits before the court of origin
without contesting jurisdiction within the timeframe provided in
the law of the State of origin, unless it is evident that an objection
to jurisdiction or to the exercise of jurisdiction would not have
succeeded under that law;
g. the judgment ruled on a contractual obligation and it was given
in the State in which performance of that obligation took place,
or should have taken place, in accordance with
i. the parties’ agreement, or
ii. (ii)the law applicable to the contract, in the absence of an
agreed place of performance,
iii. unless the defendant’s activities in relation to the transaction
clearly did not constitute a purposeful and substantial
connection to that State;
h. the judgment ruled on a tenancy of immovable property and it was
given in the State in which the property is situated;
i. the judgment ruled against the defendant on a contractual obligation
secured by a right in rem in immovable property located in the State
of origin, if the contractual claim was brought together with a claim
against the same defendant relating to that right in rem;
j. the judgment ruled on a non-contractual obligation arising from
death, physical injury, damage to or loss of tangible property, and
the act or omission directly causing such harm occurred in the State
of origin, irrespective of where that harm occurred;
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k.

the judgment concerns the validity, construction, effects,
administration or variation of a trust created voluntarily and
evidenced in writing, and –
i. at the time the proceedings were instituted, the State of origin
was designated in the trust instrument as a State in which
disputes about such matters are to be determined; or
ii. (ii)at the time the proceedings were instituted, the State of origin
was expressly or impliedly designated in the trust instrument as
the State in which the principal place of administration of the
trust is situated.
This sub-paragraph only applies to judgments regarding
internal aspects of a trust between persons who are or were
within the trust relationship;
l. the judgment ruled on a counterclaim –
i. to the extent that it was in favour of the counterclaimant,
provided that the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction
or occurrence as the claim
ii. (ii)to the extent that it was against the counterclaimant, unless
the law of the State of origin required the counterclaim to be
filed in order to avoid preclusion;
m. the judgment was given by a court designated in an agreement
concluded or documented in writing or by any other means of
communication which renders information accessible so as to be
usable for subsequent reference, other than an exclusive choice of
court agreement.
n. For the purposes of this sub-paragraph, an “exclusive choice of
court agreement” means an agreement concluded by two or more
parties that designates, for the purpose of deciding disputes which
have arisen or may arise in connection with a particular legal
relationship, the courts of one State or one or more specific courts
of one State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts.
2. If recognition or enforcement is sought against a natural person acting
primarily for personal, family or household purposes (a consumer)
in matters relating to a consumer contract, or against an employee in
matters relating to the employee’s contract of employment –
a. paragraph 1 applies only if the consent was addressed to the court,
orally or in writing;
b. paragraph 1, and do not apply.
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3. Paragraph 1 does not apply to a judgment that ruled on an intellectual
property right or an analogous right. Such a judgment is eligible for
recognition and enforcement if one of the following requirements is met –
a. the judgment ruled on an infringement in the State of origin of an
intellectual property right required to be granted or registered and
it was given by a court in the State in which the grant or registration
of the right concerned has taken place or, under the terms of an
international or regional instrument, is deemed to have taken
place[, unless the defendant has not acted in that State to initiate or
further the infringement, or their activity cannot reasonably be seen
as having been targeted at that State];
b. the judgment ruled on an infringement in the State of origin of a
copyright or related right, an unregistered trademark or unregistered
industrial design, and it was given by a court in the State for which
protection was claimed[, unless the defendant has not acted in that
State to initiate or further the infringement, or their activity cannot
reasonably be seen as having been targeted at that State];
c. the judgment ruled on the validity[, subsistence or ownership] in
the State of origin of a copyright or related right, an unregistered
trademark or unregistered industrial design, and it was given by a
court in the State for which protection was claimed.]
Article 6
Exclusive bases for recognition and enforcement
1. Notwithstanding Article 5 –
a. a judgment that ruled on the [registration or] validity of an
intellectual property right required to be granted or registered shall
be recognised and enforced if and only if the State of origin is the
State in which grant or registration has taken place, or, under the
terms of an international or regional instrument, is deemed to
have taken place;]
b. a judgment that ruled on rights in rem in immovable property shall
be recognised and enforced if and only if the property is situated in
the State of origin;
c. a judgment that ruled on a tenancy of immovable property for
a period of more than six months shall not be recognised and
enforced if the property is not situated in the State of origin and the
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courts of the Contracting State in which it is situated have exclusive
jurisdiction under the law of that State.
Article 7
Refusal of recognition or enforcement
1. Recognition or enforcement may be refused if –
a. the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent
document, including a statement of the essential elements
of the claim –
i. was not notified to the defendant in sufficient time and in
such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless
the defendant entered an appearance and presented his case
without contesting notification in the court of origin, provided
that the law of the State of origin permitted notification to
be contested; or
ii. (ii)was notified to the defendant in the requested State in a
manner that is incompatible with fundamental principles of
the requested State concerning service of documents;
b. the judgment was obtained by fraud;
c. recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with
the public policy of the requested State, including situations where
the specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible
with fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State
and situations involving infringements of security or sovereignty
of that State;
d. the proceedings in the court of origin were contrary to an
agreement, or a designation in a trust instrument, under which the
dispute in question was to be determined in a court other than the
court of origin;
e. the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment given in the requested
State in a dispute between the same parties; or
f. the judgment is inconsistent with an earlier judgment given in
another State between the same parties on the same subject matter,
provided that the earlier judgment fulfills the conditions necessary
for its recognition in the requested State;
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g.

the judgment ruled on an infringement of an intellectual property
right, applying to that [right / infringement] a law other than the
internal law of the State of origin.].
2. Recognition or enforcement may be refused or postponed if proceedings
between the same parties on the same subject matter are pending before
a court of the requested State, where –
a. the court of the requested State was seised before the court
of origin; and
b. there is a close connection between the dispute and the
requested State.
A refusal under this paragraph does not prevent a subsequent application for
recognition or enforcement of the judgment.
Article 8
Preliminary questions
1. Where a matter to which this Convention does not apply, or a matter
referred to in Article 6 on which a court other than the court referred to
in that Article ruled arose as a preliminary question, the ruling on that
question shall not be recognised or enforced under this Convention.
2. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to the
extent that, the judgment was based on a ruling on a matter to which
this Convention does not apply, or on a matter referred to in Article 6
on which a court other than the court referred to in that Article ruled.
3. However, in the case of a ruling on the validity of a right referred to in
Article 6, paragraph , recognition or enforcement of a judgment may
be postponed, or refused under the preceding paragraph, only where –
a. that ruling is inconsistent with a judgment or a decision of a
competent authority on that matter given in the State referred to in
Article 6, paragraph ; or
b. proceedings concerning the validity of that right are pending
in that State.
A refusal under sub-paragraph does not prevent a subsequent application for
recognition or enforcement of the judgment.]
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Article 9
Severability
Recognition or enforcement of a severable part of a judgment shall be granted
where recognition or enforcement of that part is applied for, or only part of the
judgment is capable of being recognised or enforced under this Convention.
Article 10
Damages
1. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to
the extent that, the judgment awards damages, including exemplary or
punitive damages, that do not compensate a party for actual loss or
harm suffered.
2. The court addressed shall take into account whether and to what extent
the damages awarded by the court of origin serve to cover costs and
expenses relating to the proceedings.
Article 11
Non-monetary remedies in intellectual property matters
In intellectual property matters, a judgment ruling on an infringement shall be
[recognised and] enforced only to the extent that it rules on a monetary remedy
in relation to harm suffered in the State of origin.]
Article 12
Judicial settlements (transactions judiciaires)
Judicial settlements (transactions judiciaires) which a court of a Contracting State
has approved, or which have been concluded in the course of proceedings before
a court of a Contracting State, and which are enforceable in the same manner as
a judgment in the State of origin, shall be enforced under this Convention in the
same manner as a judgment.
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Article 13
Documents to be produced
1. The party seeking recognition or applying for enforcement shall produce –
a. a complete and certified copy of the judgment;
b. if the judgment was given by default, the original or a certified copy
of a document establishing that the document which instituted
the proceedings or an equivalent document was notified to the
defaulting party;
c. any documents necessary to establish that the judgment has effect
or, where applicable, is enforceable in the State of origin;
d. in the case referred to in Article 13, a certificate of a court of the State
of origin that the judicial settlement or a part of it is enforceable in
the same manner as a judgment in the State of origin.
2. If the terms of the judgment do not permit the court addressed to verify
whether the conditions of this Chapter have been complied with, that
court may require any necessary documents.
3. An application for recognition or enforcement may be accompanied by
a document relating to the judgment, issued by a court (including an
officer of the court) of the State of origin, in the form recommended
and published by the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
4. If the documents referred to in this Article are not in an official
language of the requested State, they shall be accompanied by a certified
translation into an official language, unless the law of the requested State
provides otherwise.
Article 14
Procedure
1. The procedure for recognition, declaration of enforceability or
registration for enforcement, and the enforcement of the judgment,
are governed by the law of the requested State unless this Convention
provides otherwise. The court addressed shall act expeditiously.
2. The court of the requested State shall not refuse the recognition or
enforcement of a judgment under this Convention on the ground that
recognition or enforcement should be sought in another State.
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Article 15
Costs of proceedings
1. No security, bond or deposit, however described, shall be required
from a party who in one Contracting State applies for enforcement of
a judgment given in another Contracting State on the sole ground that
such party is a foreign national or is not domiciled or resident in the
State in which enforcement is sought.
2. An order for payment of costs and expenses of proceedings, made in
a Contracting State against any person exempt from requirements as
to security, bond, or deposit by virtue of paragraph 1 shall, on the
application of the person entitled to the benefit of the order, be rendered
enforceable in any other Contracting State.]
Article 16
Recognition or enforcement under national law
Subject to Article 6, this Convention does not prevent the recognition or
enforcement of judgments under national law.
CHAPTER III – GENERAL CLAUSES
Article 17
Transitional provision
This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of judgments if,
at the time the proceedings were instituted in the State of origin, the Convention
was in force in that State and in the requested State.
Article 18
Declarations limiting recognition and enforcement
A State may declare that its courts may refuse to recognise or enforce a judgment
given by a court of another Contracting State if the parties were resident in the
requested State, and the relationship of the parties and all other elements relevant
to the dispute, other than the location of the court of origin, were connected only
with the requested State.
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Article 19
Declarations with respect to specific matters
1. Where a State has a strong interest in not applying this Convention
to a specific matter, that State may declare that it will not apply the
Convention to that matter. The State making such a declaration shall
ensure that the declaration is no broader than necessary and that the
specific matter excluded is clearly and precisely defined.
2. With regard to that matter, the Convention shall not apply –
a. in the Contracting State that made the declaration;
b. in other Contracting States, where recognition or enforcement
of a judgment given in a Contracting State that made the
declaration is sought.
Article 20
Declarations with respect to judgments pertaining to governments
1. A State may declare that it shall not apply this Convention to judgments
which arose from a proceeding to which it is a party, or to which any
of its governmental agencies or any person acting on behalf of such
governmental agency is a party, only to the extent specified in the
declaration. The State making such a declaration shall ensure that the
declaration is no broader than necessary and that the exclusion from
scope is clearly and precisely defined.
2. With regard to a declaration made pursuant to paragraph (1), the
Convention shall not apply to the excluded proceedings as specified and
defined in the declaration –
a. in the Contracting State that made the declaration;
b. in other Contracting States, where recognition or enforcement
of a judgment given in a Contracting State that made the
declaration is sought.]
Article 21
Declarations with respect to common courts
1. A Contracting State may declare that –
a. a court common to two or more States exercises jurisdiction over
matters that come within the scope of this Convention; and
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b. such a court –
i. has only an appellate function; or
ii. (ii) has first instance and appellate functions.
2. Judgments of a Contracting State include –
a. judgments given by a court referred to in paragraph 1;
b. judgments given by a court referred to in paragraph 1(ii) if all States
referred to in paragraph 1 are parties to this Convention.
3. If a court referred to in paragraph 1 serves as a common court for
States some of which are Contracting States and some of which are
non-Contracting States to this Convention, judgments given by such
a court shall only be considered as judgments of a Contracting State if
the proceedings at first instance were instituted in a Contracting State.
4. In case of a judgment given by a court referred to in paragraph 1(ii)
the reference to the State of origin in Articles 5 and 6 shall be deemed
to refer to the entire territory over which that court had jurisdiction in
relation to that judgment.]
Article 22
Uniform interpretation
In the interpretation of this Convention, regard shall be had to its international
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application.
Article 23
Review of operation of the Convention
The Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law
shall at regular intervals make arrangements for –
a. review of the operation of this Convention, including any
declarations; and
b. consideration of whether any amendments to this Convention
are desirable.
Article 24
Non-unified legal systems
1. In relation to a Contracting State in which two or more systems of law
apply in different territorial units with regard to any matter dealt with
in this Convention –
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a.

any reference to the law or procedure of a State shall be construed
as referring, where appropriate, to the law or procedure in force in
the relevant territorial unit;
b. any reference to habitual residence in a State shall be construed as
referring, where appropriate, to habitual residence in the relevant
territorial unit;
c. any reference to the court or courts of a State shall be construed as
referring, where appropriate, to the court or courts in the relevant
territorial unit;
d. any reference to a connection with a State shall be construed as
referring, where appropriate, to a connection with the relevant
territorial unit.
2. Notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, a Contracting State with two
or more territorial units in which different systems of law apply shall not
be bound to apply this Convention to situations which involve solely
such different territorial units.
3. A court in a territorial unit of a Contracting State with two or more
territorial units in which different systems of law apply shall not be bound
to recognise or enforce a judgment from another Contracting State
solely because the judgment has been recognised or enforced in another
territorial unit of the same Contracting State under this Convention.
4. This Article shall not apply to a Regional Economic
Integration Organisation.
Article 25
Relationship with other international instruments
1. This Convention shall be interpreted so far as possible to be compatible
with other treaties in force for Contracting States, whether concluded
before or after this Convention.
2. This Convention shall not affect the application by a Contracting State
of a treaty [or other international instrument] that was concluded
before this Convention entered into force for that Contracting State [as
between Parties to that instrument].
3. This Convention shall not affect the application by a Contracting State
of a treaty [or other international instrument] concluded after this
Convention entered into force for that Contracting State for the purposes
of obtaining recognition or enforcement of a judgment given by a court
of a Contracting State that is also a Party to that instrument. [Nothing in
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the other instrument shall affect the obligations under Article 6 towards
Contracting States that are not Parties to that instrument.]
4. This Convention shall not affect the application of the rules of a Regional
Economic Integration Organisation that is a Party to this Convention,
whether adopted before or after this Convention as concerns the
recognition or enforcement of judgments as between Member States of
the Regional Economic Integration Organisation.
5. A Contracting State may declare that other international instruments
listed in the declaration shall remain unaffected by this Convention.]
[Chapter IV, Final Clauses, is omitted.]

